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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
LeROY :MECHA~f, 
Plainti_ff and Respondent, 
vs. 
MATTHEW FOLEY, Case No. 7637 
Defendant and Appellant, and 
GRY GULCH IRRIGATION COM-
PANY, a Utah Corporation, 
Defendant. , 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
While respondent accepts generally the Statement of Facts 
recited in appellant's brief, it would appear advisable that 
respondent supplement that statement by briefly indicating 
that while there was no corroboration from any eye witness 
there was circumstantial corroboration of respondent's testi-
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mony concerning the altercation on May 30 in that five unused 
Camel cigarettes of the kind used by respondent and carried 
that day in an open package in the breast pocket of respondent's 
shirt were picked up by respondent's mother in the corral and 
yard in a path extending from the place where the respondent 
testified he was first struck by appellant to the shed near which 
appellant testified he knocked respondent down several times 
Tr. 92-96, and plaintiff's exhibit "P" (paper bag and five cigar-
ettes therein) . Also, that by defendant's answer he claims he 
struck plaintiff several times with his fists in self -defense, 
"which said striking of plaintiff by defendant was with force 
necessary to be used to prevent great bodily injury to defend-
ant." Tr. 226. 
ARGUMENT 
In answering appellant's brief, under Argument, respond-
ent will take up the points designated by appellant in the 
order stated in appellant's brief. 
POINT I 
RESPONDENT'S ANSWER TO APPELLANT'S POINT 
ONE, SAID POINT ONE BEING, The Court Erred in Award-
ing Respondent One Thousand Dollars or Any General Dam-
ages, Such Judgment Being Unsupported By the Evidence. 
Respondent respectfully says that according to the record 
in this case no instance was shown that a so-called quarrel or 
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fight of plaintiff was unjustified nor was it shown that plain· 
tiff was doing anything but simply standing up for his rights. 
The witness who testified that respondent's reputation was bad 
appeared to be biased and prejudiced mainly because of the 
trouble that plaintiff has had with the Dry Gulch Irrigation 
Company, with whom all but one had been identified in one 
way or another, in getting water due him for irrigation. Fur-
thermore, if such was respondent's reputation appellant must 
have been fully aware of this when he went on to plaintiff's 
premises on May 30, 1950. Appellant stresses that he and 
his wife testified that respondent struck the first blow, but 
fails to consider the significance of his own acts in what he 
terms "self defense." Disregarding entirely respondent's 
testimony concerning the altercation, the appellant's own 
testimony shows him to be the aggressor and that he wilfully 
administered a severe beating to respondent rendering him un-
conscious and unable to arise from a prostrate condition on 
the ground. 
Appellant testified: 
Q. "And what happened?" 
A. "W' ell, at that point, he struck me on. the side of 
the head." 
Q. "Then what happened?" 
A. "Well, we commenced to fighting there. I don't 
think that he hit me but very few times, possibly only 
twice. I knocked Roy down. I'd stand there. Roy 
would get up on his knees, get up and come running 
at me like a mad dog. And I'd knock him down again. 
This continued on until he quit coming back, until he 
quit coming. I walked over to him. He started to raise 
)· 
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himself upon his elbows, trying to get up again. I took 
hold of his shoulders, put my hands under his arm 
pits and set him up. I picked his hat up off the ground 
and set it on his head." T r. 15 3-154. 
And on cross-examination appellant testified: 
Q. "That's all there was, he just hit you for telling 
him that he could have some water?" 
A. "Yes, sir." Tr. 160. 
Also 
A. "He'd get up slow. He'd get up very slowly." 
Q. .. And he did that after you knocked him down 
the first time?" 
A. "Yes, sir." 
Q. "And then you stood there and when he got up, 
you hit him again, is that right?" 
A. "When he'd coming running, yes, sir." 
Q. "How far away were you?" 
A. "He'd usually stagger and fall, oh, possibly 5 
or 6 feet away from me, when he'd go down." 
Q. "And then he'd come running back 5 or 6 feet?" 
1\.. "'Yes, sir." 
Q. "And you would let him have another one?" 
A. "Yes, sir." 
Q. "Five or six?" 
A. "Well, several times, yes, sir." Tr. 16:. 
Concerning the altercation, respondent's testimony shows 
that he had placed some pigs in a pen adjoining his corral and 
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wired the gate shut. On pages 38 to 40 of transcript appears 
the following testimony of respondent: 
Q ... Then what happened, Mr. Mecham? Just tell 
the court what happened to the best of your ability." 
A. "I turned around to leave, and as I turned around 
Mat was standing right behind me, and as I turned, 
he hit me over the head with something." 
Q. "Do you know what he hit you with?" 
A. "No, I didn't see it. He hit me just as I turned." 
Q. "What if anything did you do?" 
A. "I don't know what I done after that. That's 
where I quit remembering. I don't know what hap-
pened." 
Q. "Do you know whether Mr. Foley struck you?" 
A. "I never seen him make a move. I looked him 
right in the face. It was just for an instant, as I turned 
around and that's where I quit remembering was right 
there.'' 
Q. "Is this ~Ir. Foley in the courtroom?" 
A. "Yes, sir.". 
Q. "Sitting at the table next to Mr. Henriod ?" 
A. "Yes, sir." 
Q. "Was he the man that stood there?" 
A. "Yes, sir." 
Q. "Did Mr. Foley say anything to you at that time?" 
A. "No, sir." 
Q. "Where were you when you next remembered?" 
A. "I was at the house." 
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Q. "Where, what part of the house?" 
A. "I was-I was on the porch." 
Q. "Is that on the north side of the house, or the 
south?" 
A. ~'That is on the north side." 
Q. "And what if anything took place then, do you 
remember?" 
A. "When I first remember, I thought mother was 
shaking me, and asking me what had happened." 
Q. "And what did you do then, do you remember, 
Mr. Mecham?" 
A. "Well, I remember her questioning me. That's 
the first I remember, was her shaking me. I thought 
she was shaking me, and asking me what had happened. 
And she said, 'Did that ditch rider hit you?' or 'Did 
that devil hit you?' And I said, 'Who?' And she said, 
'The ditch rider was here.' And I said, 'What would 
he hit me for?' And she said, 'For turning him in.' 
And I said, 'What did I turn him in for?' She said, 
There is Mr. l\1illigan, ask him.' So I went down and 
asked Mr. Milligan what for." 
Q. "Do you recall how long you stayed there with 
him?" 
A. "Well ,it was only just a few minutes that I 
stayed. I asked him what we went to Duchesne for, 
and he said, 'We went up there to see about that water.' 
And I began to remember then, that that's what we 
went to see Rulon for. He said, 'We went to see Rulon 
Larson.' And I began to remember that that was what 
we had come for. So I went back home." Tr. 38-40. 
The finding of the unused Camel cigarettes on the ground 
by the mother of respondent on the morning following the 
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altercation, which were the kind used by the respondent, in 
a path commencing at the place where respondent says he was 
first struck, is a circumstance corroborating respondent's testi-
mony. Tr. 92-96. 
The court had all of these matters presented fully before 
it and not only heard the testimony of witnesses, but Judge Dun-
ford went on the premises where plaintiff was injured and exam-
ined the same and observed all of the conditions obtaining there 
and then made findings and judgment, sustaining which there 
appears to be ample evidence. The record shows that no com-
petent evidence presented was not duly considered by the 
court and no bias nor prejudice of the court has been claimed 
nor shown by appellant. 
In contending that the award is grossly excessive and is 
not supported by the evidence it would appear that appellant 
has disregarded entirely the evidence of injury. Respondent 
stated, and such was not contradicted, that he was knocked 
unconscious and did not remember anything thereafter until 
his mother shook him asking him what happened while he 
was sitting on the porch of their house. Tr. 39-40. He also 
testified that sometime after he had talked with his neighbor, 
Mr. Milligan, after receiving the injuries complained of, he 
looked in the mirror and saw that one eye was shut and that 
he was all bruised up and that there was blood all over him 
and that the left side of his head was bruised. Tr. 40; Respond-
ent further testified that his pain was bad, that he had a large 
lump over his left ear which remained there until August, 
1950, that his left eye was blackened and swollen shut, that 
his nose was sore ,and he could not breathe through it for 
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seve,ral weeks, that he had difficulty in eating due to injuries, 
saying: 
A. " ... it didn't seem that I could get my jaws 
opened wide enough to get anything into my mouth. 
I had to break it with my fingers to get it into my mouth. 
I couldn't get my mouth wide enough open to even eat 
a slice of bread." 
And further stated that this condition continued for a month 
or more, "six weeks." Tr. 44. 
In this connection, attention is directed to plaintiff's ex-
hibits K and L, admitted in evidence, which ar~ photographs 
of plaintiff taken on the Friday following the Tuesday when 
the injuries were inflicted. These photographs show the left 
eye of plaintiff to be swollen closed and discolored on the day 
the photographs were taken. Tr. 45-46. · 
Respondent was concerned about a skull fracture and pro-
cured X-ray photog,raphs of his skull to be taken at the hos-
pital at Roosevelt, Utah. Tr. 46-47. 
Since receiving the beating administered on May 30, 
respondent has suffered with headaches and other head pains 
"up to recently," Tr. 48, and plaintiff further testified: 
A. "And sometimes now it isn't exactly a headache, 
but just a pain goes though my head, and then that's 
the end of it, just like something shooting through." 
Q. "Is that on the left side of your head?" 
A. "Yes, sir, and sometimes from the back of my 
neck, running up through my head this way too." 
Q. "Did you suffer with any such headaches prior 
to this occurrence?" 
A. "_No, sir." 
10 
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Respondent has also suffered with a swollen eye lid which 
continued down to and including the time of trial, with which 
he had not suffered prior to May 30, 1950. Tr. 48-49. 
Respondent further testified that he has had dizzy spells or 
groggy spells at times since the occurrence on May 30, 
which he had not experienced prior thereto, · Tr. 49, and 
that prior to May 30 he was in good health and that since 
the occurrence on ~Iay 30 he wakes up at night and "it feels 
like a muscle in my head just is trembling like that now." 
And respondent further testified that since the occurrence on 
May 30 he hasn't been able to work as he usually did prior 
thereto-"hasn't the energy, tires quickly." Tr. 49-50. 
Concerning respondent's injuries jvirs.Jane Mecham, plain-
tiff's mother, testified: 
Q. "And did you observe his face and head?" 
A. "Yes. I see he was all blood. He was just all 
blood and ... " 
Q. "Were hjs clothes covered with blood or had 
blood on them?" 
A. "His clothes had blood on them, yes. And they 
had dirt on them." Tr. 90. 
She also testified that respondent had a lump on the side 
of his head which was there "until just recently." 
Q. "Did you observe his left eye?" 
A. "Yes, sir. His left eye was swollen, I think 
entirely shut. Right clear shut for a few days." 
11 
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This witness further testified that respondent's left eye 
was blackened and also his face, "even on the other side" was 
discolored, which lasted for days and that respondent's left 
eye bothers him, and that respondent complained of head-
aches after the occurrence. Tr. 97-98. 
This witness was afraid respondent's jaw was broken 
and testified: 
A. "He had a time in eating. Now he had ... I 
was afraid his jaw was broken. I told him 'I think 
your jaw must be broken.' He couldn't get his mouth 
opened; he couldn't get a spoon in his mouth. He had 
to break his food up in real little bits and put it in with 
his fingers." 
Q. "How long did that condition obtain, do you 
remember?" 
A. "Well, it seemed to me it must have been a 
week anyway. And he couldn't breathe. He had to 
breathe through his mouth. His nose, there was some-
thing wrong with it. He couldn't breathe through his 
nose." 
Q. "Did he ever have that trouble prior to this hap-
pening on May 30 ?" 
A. "No, sir." Tr. 99. 
William Milligan, a neighbor living near plaintiff, testi-
fied that he saw respondent on the evening of May 30 and 
respondent had dry blood running out of his nose, a bruise on · 
the left side of his face and a swelling back on the jaw or 
temple on the left side. Tr. 102. 
This witness testified that respondent "acted like so1;11e-
12 
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thing had happened,"-and that he did not act as though he 
knew what he was doing-"he acted just kind of docile, you 
might say, or just like he was thinking about something else 
all the time." Tr. 103. 
On cross-examination this witness testified as follows: 
Q. "Was he out of his head?" 
A. "Well, I couldn't say he was. I am ... not a 
doctor, and I couldn't say a man is insane, unless I 
knew it." 
Q. "In your opinion was he out of his head?" 
A. "Well, he talked that way." Tr. 108. 
Arzy lHitchell, sheriff of Duchesne County, testified that 
he saw respondent on the evening of May 30 at the home 
of the sheriff in Duchesne and observed a lump on the left 
side of respondent's head near his temple, that respondent's 
left eye was black and S\vollen, that respondent's nose had 
been bleeding and was swollen, that respondent's face on 
the side of his head was discolored, and that respondent had 
the appearance of a man who had been recently beaten. Tr. 
113. 
Dr. Harry Berman, eye, ear, nose and throat specialist, testi-
fied that he examined plaintiff on August 29 and 30, 1950 and 
observed on these dates that plaintiff's left eye lid was swollen 
about half-way shut, 'that in his opinion the drainage channels 
from respondent's left eye lid were injured by the blow re-
ceived by respondent on May 30, and that this injury may 
result in permanent damage to respondent.. Tr. 120. 
l .... _) 
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Concerning headache- Dr. Berman testified as follows in 
answer to the following hypothetical question: 
Q. "Now, assume that ... I will give you this hypo-
thetical case, Doctor: Now assume that a person did 
not have headaches prior to a blow received on the 
head, and that over a period of three months after 
that blow he complained of a constant headache, 
would you have an opinion as to the cause of that head-
ache?" 
A. "It would be natural to conclude that the head-
ache was the result of the injury." Tr. 121. 
It is conceded that it is difficult to place a money value 
upon injuries of the type suffered by respondent. However, 
respondent urges that even $1,000.00 is far short of adequately 
compensating him for such in juries. In this regard attention 
is directed to the case of Apostolos vs. Chelemes (Utah), 298 
P. 399> decided by this court in April, 1931, 20 years ago, 
in which this court held that damages awarded to plaintiff 
consisting of $1,180.70 general, $500.00 exemplary and $319.00 
special, for injuries from malicious assault, causing deafness 
in one ear, werenot excessive. While the injuries in that case 
might be considered greater, still the injuries sustained by 
respondent would appear to be substantial, and this court can 
very well take notice of the fact that the value of our money 
now is far less than its value in the year 1931, possibly less than 
one-half. 
The rule repeatedly announced by this court to the effect 
that if the findings and judgment of the lower court are sup-
ported by competent evidence, then this court may not disturb 
them, would appear to be applicable in this case. 
14 
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Ercanbrack vs. Ellison, 103 Utah 138, 134 Pac. 2nd, 177, 
Sine vs. Salt Lake Transportation Company, 106 Utah 289, 
147 Pac. 2nd 875, 
Horsley vs. Robinson et al, 112 Utah 227, 186 Pac. 2nd 
592, 
Williams vs. Ogden Union Railway and Depot Company, 
No. 7471, this court, decided in 1951. 
POINT II 
RESPONDENT'S ANSWER TO APPELLANT'S POINT 
TWO, SAID POINT TWO BEING, the Court Erred in Award-
ing Respondent $100.00 Punitive Damages, Such Judgment 
Being Unsupported by the Evidence. 
The Lower Court's Finding No. 5 being, "that the afore-
said striking by defendant Matthew Foley was malicious, 
willful, unprovoked and without cause," appears to be amply 
sustained by the evidence as above pointed out. That being 
true, punitive damages would be allowable in this case. The 
"good words for defendant" referred to by appellant in his 
brief would appear to be of no consequence in the light of 
the actual conduct of appellant as shown by the testimony of 
respondent quoted herein and also by the testimony of appellant 
himself, referred to under Point I herein. 
In 123 A.L.R. 1116 there appears the following general 
statement in connection with an annotation on punitive or 
exemplary damages for assault: 
1'5 
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"The doctrine that exemplary or punitive· -damages 
may be allowed for an assault and battery committed 
wantonly, maliciously, or under circumstances of ag-
grevation, heretofore well established in most juris-
dictions, has been affirmed, applied, or at least recog-
nized, in the following recent cases:" 
and many cases are cited on Pages 1116, 1117 and 1118, in-
cluding the two Utah cases of Johanson vs. Huntsman (1922) 
60 Ut. 402, 209 Pac. 197 and Apostolos vs. Chelemes ( 1931) 
77 Ut. 587, 298 Pac. 399, in both of which punitive damages 
were awarded and allowed under circumstances similar to those 
obtaining in the instant case. 
On page 1122 of 123 A.L.R. there appears the following 
general statement concerning malice, which supplements 16 
A.L.R. 808: 
"As pointed out in the earlier annotations, the 
authorities generally hold that to justify exemplary 
damages for an assault, actual malice need not be ex-
pressly proved; that is, there need be no direct proof 
of ill will, hatred, or an intent to injure, but malice 
may be inferred." 
In 4 American Jurisprudence, Assault and Battery, para-
graph 187, page 216, the following statement appears: 
"As a general rule, exemplary or punitive damages 
may be allowed for an assault and battery committed 
wantonly, maliciously or under circumstances of ag-
grevation.'' 
In Littledike vs. Wood (Utah), 255 Pac. 172, on page 
174 this court quoted from Rugg vs. Tolman (Utah), 117 
Pac. 54, saying: 
16 
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"Exemplary, pumbve or vindictive damages are 
such damages as are in excess of the actual loss, and are 
allowed where a tort is aggrevated by evil motive, ac-
tual malice, deliberate violence, oppression or fraud, 
... or where the defendant acted willfully or with such 
gross negligence as to indicate a wanton disregard of 
the rights of others.·· 
POINT III 
RESPONDENT'S ANSWER TQ APPELLANT'S POINT 
THREE, SAID POINT THREE BEING, The Court Erred in 
Failing to Award Judgment for the Appellant on His Counter-
Claim, the Evidence Indicating That Respondent Was the 
Aggressor. 
As has been heretofore stated, the lmver court heard the 
testimony of the witnesses in this case and in addition thereto 
went on the premises where the altercation took place and 
observed all the conditions obtaining and, being the trier of 
the facts, was entitled to and did accept and adopt the position 
taken by respondent. It is again urged that this position is 
amply sustained by the evidence. 
Furthermore, it would appear that the evidence most 
favorable to appellant fails to reveal any damage suffered by 
him. Appellant testified that the extent of any injury to him 
was an "abrased or skinned" place on the left side of his face, 
" ... just a skinned place there," Tr. 151, and appellant's wife 
testified that such was the condition and that fi. rst aid was not 
required. Tr. 136. 
17 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits that appellant has presented no basis 
nor reason what ever for the reversal of the judgment of the 
lower court and urges that said judgment be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RULON J. LARSEN 
and 
LLEWELLYN 0. THOMAS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent 
18 
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